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What is a human rights law journal doing hosting a
symposium on financial modernization law? Organizers of this
Symposium, Financial Modernization: The Effect of the Repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act on Consumers and Communities,2 certainly heard
this question more than once. Perhaps the answer can best be
summed up in two words: access and control. By offering loans,
banks provide access to capital and meaningful participation in the
economy. By gathering and maintaining the personal information that
is necessary to make loans and provide other financial services, banks
gain vast amounts of personal information about their customers, the
sharing of which their customers do not necessarily control.
In November, 1999, Congress repealed and amended
significant portions of two pillars of the bank regulatory system, the
Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).3
Together, these laws served to create a wall between commercial
banking and insurance and investment banking.4  The law that
replaced them, known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 5 now permits financial
institutions to engage in all three of these businesses. As a result,
banks can now function as financial conglomerates, offering, as
1 Professor of Law, New York Law School.
2 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 1-126 (2001).
3 David L. Glass, The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act: An Overview of the Key
Provisions; Presentation Before the State of New York Banking Department, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2001).
4id.
5 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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GLBA supporters put it, "one-stop shopping" for financial services.
6
The potential for larger and more diversified banks raises
several questions about access to capital and control over the
dissemination of personal information. Will such banks be responsive
to the credit needs of their communities? Particularly low and
moderate-income neighborhoods within their communities? Will they
share private consumer information with other companies? Will
consumers have control over whether a bank can do this? In short,
what, as this Symposium asks, will the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act mean for consumers and communities?
SETTING THE STAGE
To set the stage for examining these issues, David L. Glass'
overview of the GLBA describes the legal landscape prior to the
GLBA and afterwards. 7 The Glass-Steagall Act (for which David
Glass accepts no responsibility) separated commercial banking from
investment banking. It prohibited banks from underwriting securities
or affiliating with any company that was engaged principally in
underwriting securities, it forbade firms engaged in underwriting from
taking deposits, and it prohibited interlocking directorates and
management personnel between banks and securities firms. 8 The
BHCA prohibited banks from engaging in any business not closely
related to banking, and defined insurance as not closely related to
banking.
9
As the overview points out, the GLBA could have done away
with these restrictions in just a few sentences.' 0 Nevertheless, the
GLBA covers 380 pages, reflecting a law that addresses the concerns
of several competing constituencies and does much more than simply
6 Lawrence J. White, Financial Modernization. What's in it for
Communities?, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 122 (2001).
7 See Glass, supra note 3.




permit banks to engage in the securities and insurance businesses.1'
David Glass describes much of the "more" that the GLBA does; the
rest of this Symposium is concerned with the part of the "more"
dealing with access to capital and control over the dissemination of
personal information.
The starting point for analyzing GLBA's impact on access to
capital is the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), which states
that banks have an affirmative obligation to meet the credit needs of
their local communities in general, and low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods in particular.12 The CRA requires four federal banking
regulatory agencies to examine banks periodically to assess their
performance at meeting local credit needs, to issue a written
examination report with one of four performance ratings, and to take a
bank's CRA record into account when considering its applications to
expand its business.13  Members of the public can comment on a
bank's applications, and a bank with a poor CRA rating risks denial of
the application.'
4
There are three key provisions related to the CRA in the
GLBA, and two "non-provisions." First, a state chartered bank that
wants to engage in the insurance and securities businesses must first
become a financial holding company (FHC), and a national bank that
wants to engage in these businesses must first create a "financial
subsidiary."' 5 In order to become an FHC, all of the institution's bank
subsidiaries must be well-capitalized, well-managed, and have at least
a "satisfactory" CRA rating.' 6 Once an entity is an FHC, its bank
subsidiaries must maintain at least a satisfactory CRA rating,
otherwise it will not be permitted to enter into the securities or
"Id. at 1-2.
12 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2908 (West Supp. 2000).
13 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2903, 2906. The ratings are "outstanding," "satisfactory,"
"needs to improve," and "substantial non-compliance." Id. at § 2906 (b) (2).
14 Procedures for members of the public to comment on applications are
published at 12 C.F.R. Parts 5, 225, 262, 303, and 516 (2000). The federal banking
agencies' authority to deny bank applications appears at 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.13, 25.29, 222.29
(c), 345.29 (d), and 563e.29 (2001).
15 See Glass, supra note 3, at 3.
16 Id. at 4, 9.
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insurance businesses. 17 The requirements for financial subsidiaries
are similar.' 8  Second, the GLBA provides for less frequent
examinations of smaller banks if they have at least a satisfactory CRA
rating.' 9 Third, the GLBA creates a so-called "sunshine" provision,
which requires lenders and community groups to disclose the
provisions of CRA-related lending agreements they enter into. 20 As
for the two "non-provisions," the GLBA does not require banks to
apply to create an FHC or financial subsidiary, but rather permits
them to elect to do so and to submit a filing indicating their intention
to do so. 2 1 The GLBA does not permit public comment on filings to
become on FHC or financial subsidiary, thus precluding advocates
from commenting on a bank's CRA record in connection with the
bank's plan to engage in the securities or insurance businesses.
Second, the GLBA does not extend the CRA to the insurance or
securities aspects of a financial institution's business.
Three important provisions of the GLBA relate to a
consumer's ability to control private information. First, the GLBA
permits a financial institution to share private information about a
customer with its affiliated institutions without getting the customer's
permission.2 2  Second, the GLBA permits a financial institution to
share customer information with a non-affiliated third party as long as
the customer has not "opted-out" of allowing such disclosure.23
Finally, the GLBA requires a financial institution to disclose its
policies relating to the sharing of private information to its customers
when the relationship begins and annually thereafter.2 4
With these basics in mind, the Symposium turns to analyzing
the GLBA's effect on access to capital and control over private
information.
1d. at 6.
8 ld. at 14.
9 1d. at 18.
20 See Glass, supra note 3, at 18.
21 Id. at 3-4.
22 Id. at 20.
23 Id. at 19-20.
24 1d. at 19.
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ACCESS TO CAPITAL
Michael Bylsma, the director of the Community and
Consumer Law Division of the Comptroller of the Currency and
Deborah Goldberg, the of the Center for Community Change, have
25different perspectives about the GLBA's effect on access to capital.
Bylsma states that in his view, "GLBA will not significantly alter the
CRA or the positive role it plays in increasing access to credit among
low- and moderate-income persons in this country., 26 Goldberg, on
the other hand, in asking what low-income communities will get from
the GLBA, answers, "Not much, or at least, not much that's good.
27
Bylsma and Goldberg analyze the three key CRA-related
provisions of GLBA. Bylsma states that the provisions prohibiting
banks from expanding into the securities and insurance businesses
unless they have a satisfactory CRA rating will ensure that banks
continue to fulfill their CRA obligations.28  Even though this
provision does not require banks to apply to engage in these new
businesses or permit members of the public to comment on the
applications, Bylsma points out that things could have been worse for
communities: the Senate's version of the financial modernization bill
did not include any provisions tying a bank's right to engage in new
businesses to its CRA record.29 Deborah Goldberg is less sanguine
about this provision, describing it as "a modest provision designed to
insure that bank holding companies . . .cannot completely abandon
service to low-income people and communities in their quest for new
financial services horizons., 30 Goldberg calls the provision a "useful
statement of public policy" that "will surely have some impact," but
warns that the impact should not be overstated since 98 percent of
banks and thrifts currently receive satisfactory or better CRA
25 See Michael S. Bylsma, Financial Modernization: What's in itfor Local
Communities?, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 37 (2001); Deborah Goldberg, Remarks of
Deborah Goldberg, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS 65 (2001).
26 See Bylsma, supra note 25, at 39.
27 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 65.
28 See Bylsma, supra note 25, at 47.
29 Id.
30 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 65.
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ratings.3'
Second, Michael Bylsma expresses optimism about the
extended examination cycle for small banks with satisfactory or better
CRA ratings. He believes that this will be an incentive for small
banks to get and maintain at least a satisfactory CRA record.
Bylsma also notes that this provision is better for CRA enforcement
than earlier versions of the GLBA, which would have exempted 76
percent of all rural banks from the CRA.33 Deborah Goldberg, on the
other hand, states that extending small banks' CRA examination
cycles is unlikely to reduce regulatory burden for them, because their
safety and soundness and consumer compliance examinations will not
be on shorter cycles, and their CRA exams, although less frequent,
will cover more time.34 In contrast to the-lack of benefit to banks,
Goldberg argues that the extended examination cycle may hurt the
public, especially in rural areas where small banks play a very
important role.
35
Finally, Bylsma addresses the "sunshine" provision. He
asserts that while the provision places new burdens on financial
institutions and community groups that enter into CRA lending
agreements, the provision should provide members of the public with
more information about CRA activities in their communities, deter
agreements that are made for vague or ill-defined motives, and help
ensure that funds committed in the agreements are accounted for.
36
Bylsma points out once again that things could have been worse for
the CRA, as earlier versions of the financial modernization law would
have created a "safe harbor" from public scrutiny for expansion
applications from banks with satisfactory CRA ratings.37 Deborah
Goldberg, on the other hand, saves her strongest criticism for the
"sunshine" provision. She states that the "sunshine" provision is
likely to have a "chilling effect" on CRA activity, discouraging
" Id. at 66.
32 See Bylsma, supra note 25, at 42.
33 id.
34 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 67.
35 id.
36 See Bylsma, supra note 25, at 50.
37 Id. at 48-50.
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community groups from participating in the CRA regulatory process
and discouraging the partnerships that have emerged between banks
and community groups, both of which have been fundamental to
CRA's success. 38 Goldberg asserts that this chilling effect is exactly
what "sunshine's" sponsors intended, and that it will further Senator
Gramm's "anti-CRA crusade."
39
In two contrasting views of the future role of the CRA in a
financially modernized world, Deborah Goldberg and Lawrence J.
White, the Arthur E. Imperatore Professor of Economics at New York
University's Stern School of Business, initially agree that financial
modernization has passed the CRA by.40 Their remedies, however,
differ. Professor White calls the CRA a "localist anachronism in the
wider and more competitive financial world of the twenty-first
century."' 1 He argues that the CRA pressures banks to subsidize
projects with a public purpose, and should be replaced with a system
of public subsidies. 42 Deborah Goldberg, on the other hand, lists
several trends that threaten the CRA, including bank consolidation,
increasingly complex corporate structures, technology, and affiliations
with other financial services institutions.43 In contrast to Professor
White, however, she calls for a "modernized" CRA to ensure its
continued effectiveness.44
CONTROL OVER PRIVATE INFORMATION
Depending on your perspective, the GLBA is either the
"'greatest expansion of personal privacy in the history of American
finance,"' or "'Consumers, investors and the American public will
have no protection [of] their privacy whatsoever under this bill. '' ' 5
38 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 67.
39 id.
40 Id.; see also White, supra note 6.
41 See White, supra note 6, at 125.
42 Id. at 126.
43 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 68-76.
44 
Id. at 73.
45 See Gregory T. Nojeim, Financial Privacy 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
79, 80 (2001), quoting Rep. Sue Kelly (R-NY) and Rep. John Dingell (D-MI),
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One of our Symposium contributors represents the first perspective,
one represents the second perspective, and two mediate between
them.
Dolores S. Smith, Director of the Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and John H. Mann, a senior attorney in the Division, mediate
these perspectives. They describe the regulations several federal
agencies recently issued to implement the privacy provisions of the
GLBA.46 Smith and Mann assert that the regulations seek to strike a
balance between the interests of consumers in controlling personal
information and the interests of the financial services industry in
minimizing the costs of affording consumers this control.47 They cite,
among others, four examples of this balancing effort. First, the
regulations define personal information broadly to include virtually all
the information a financial institution obtains about a customer.48
They assert that this provision benefits consumers by bringing a large
volume of information under control, and benefits banks by creating a
clear definition, thus reducing compliance burdens.49 Second, the
regulations require the privacy notices to cover a broad range of
topics, but promote concise notices, which are easier for consumers to
absorb. 50 In addition, if an institution wants to reserve the right to
disclose all personal information, it simply needs to say so, it need not
provide examples of the sorts of information it will reveal.51 Third,
the regulations contain exceptions to the statutory ban on sharing
customer account numbers that Smith and Mann assert will benefit
financial institutions and consumers by allowing institutions to
disclose account numbers to certain entities such as mail houses that
send out promotional statements about the institution's products with
respectively.
46 See Dolores S. Smith and James H. Mann, The New Consumer Financial
Privacy Regulations: Balancing the Interests of Consumers and Industry, 17 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS 91 (2001).
47 Id. at 91-92.
481 d. at 99.
49 Id. at 100.
50 ld. at 101.
51 See Smith and Mann, supra note 46, at 100-101.
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the institution's bills or to the institution's clients in affinity credit
52card programs. Fourth, the regulations delay the statutory
implementation date of the privacy provisions by approximately seven
months, enough time for financial institutions to develop compliance
programs but not too much time to excessively delay implementation
of the law.53 Smith and Mann conclude that this mediation between
consumer and financial industry interests will continue not only in
agency rulemaking but by Congress and State legislatures as they
consider additional privacy legislation. 4
David Glass returns to the Symposium to present his
perspective on GLBA's effect on consumer privacy. 5 Glass argues
that GLBA's provision permitting for cross-marketing of products
among a bank's affiliates is a pro-consumer provision, because
"vigorous competition is the best way to ensure that consumers can
have the greatest possible choice among the products and services
they want and need.,
56
Gregory Nojeim, legislative counsel for the American Civil
Liberties Union, has a different perspective. 57 He argues that the pre-
GLBA walls between insurance companies, banks, and securities
firms operated as a de facto privacy protection, but once the GLBA
removed these walls, it also eliminated the privacy protection without
providing a sufficient replacement. Nojeim argues that the GLBA
violates the "golden rule" of informational privacy: "sensitive
personal information given for one purpose ought not to be used for
other purposes without the express consent of the person to whom the
information relates. 59 In place of GLBA's "illusory" privacy
protections, Nojeim favors "true consent," which would require
consumers to expressly consent to the disclosure of personal
5 2 Id. at 102.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See David L. Glass, Remarks of David L. Glass, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 51 (2001).
56 d. at 54-55.
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information. 60
In conclusion, as will become evident in reading the articles in
this Symposium, perhaps the only thing all our Symposium authors
agree on is that the debate over access to capital and control over
personal information started by the GLBA promises to continue for
many years.
60ld. at 84-85.
